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Abstract: 
Scientific comparative psychology in America dates from the mid-1890s, but there is a body of 
earlier literature on the topic, written during a period of theistic debates over Darwinian 
evolution. The anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan rejected instinct as an explanation of animal 
behavior in 1843 and defended the mental similarities between animals and humans, although he 
was not an evolutionist. John Bascom's textbook Comparative Psychology (1878) is the earliest 
American work to use that title, and its theistic approach anticipates some arguments found in 
much later evolutionary works. Beginning in 1860, the geologist Joseph LeConte, who is well 
known for defending the compatibility of evolution and religion, wrote several articles in which 
he outlined a comparative evolutionary approach to psychological problems. However, these 
writers did not establish a coherent research tradition and were ignored by the "New 
Psychologists" of the 1880s. 
 
Article: 
A widely accepted account of the early history of comparative psychology in America is roughly as 
follows. By the last two decades of the 19th century, the evolutionary writings of Charles Darwin 
and his followers (especially George J. Romanes and Conwy Lloyd Morgan) had brought the study of 
animal and human psychology under the same theoretical rubric. Stimulated by the ideas of these 
British writers, and encouraged by the burgeoning success in experimental psychology of 
methods imported from German laboratories, a handful of scientists began looking for ways to 
study animal psychology with the same degree of precision and control. The earliest American 
comparative psychologists—Wesley Mills (1847-1915), Linus W. Kline (1866–?), Willard S. Small 
(1870-1943), and Edward L. Thorndike (1874-1949)— 
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following the lead of Lloyd Morgan, developed methods for the controlled study of learning in 
animals, using problems such as mazes and puzzle boxes. The comparative study of animal learning 
that grew out of these early efforts became the backbone of comparative psychology and the 
precursor of Watsonian behaviorism. According to this account, there was no indigenous American 
comparative psychology prior to the 1890s.
1 
 
Historians of psychology have, in general, paid little attention to American psychology prior to the 
publication of Principles of Psychology
2
 in 1890. James M. Cattell wittily compared the history of 
American psychology before 1880 to "the alleged chapter on snakes in a certain natural history of 
Iceland—`There are no snakes in Iceland'," and later described American psychology during this 
period as being "like Heaven, for there was not a damned soul there."
3
 Edwin Boring ignored all 
American psychology before James,
4
 and even Ernest Hilgard' s 1,000-page Psychology in 
America dismissed pre-Jamesian contributions in a mere six paragraphs.
5
 Historical accounts of 
comparative psychology have thus followed a well-established trend in the historiography of 
American psychology generally. 
 
However, there was in fact a long-standing tradition of psychological inquiry in America before 
James, going back to Thomas Upham's Elements of Intellectual Philosophy (1827),
6
 and at least 10 books 
with the word psychology in their titles were published by American scholars between 1840 and 
1880.
7
 Although American scientific psychology, including scientific comparative psychology, is 
a product of the last years of the 19th century, the seeds of its development can certainly be seen in 
much earlier writings. In this article I discuss the work of three writers, all of whom wrote insightfully 
on topics that would become centrally important in comparative psychology, although they were 
often described as belonging to the study of "animal psychology." 
 
What distinguished writers of the period under consideration from the "New Psychologists"
8
 of the 
1880s and 1890s (of whom Cattell was a pre-eminent spokesman) was that they were much closer 
to the old tradition of speculative mental philosophy than to the approach of German-trained 
scientific psychologists usually identified as the founders of the discipline in America—James, Hall, 
Cattell, Titchener, Münsterberg, and their contemporaries. Nonetheless, the mental philosophers 
helped to set the stage for the establishment of scientific psychology, which was far from being 
simply a German import planted in the fertile but unplowed soil of American psychological 
inquiry.
9 
 
The mental philosophy of Upham (1827, 1861), Francis Wayland (1854), Laurens P. Hickok (1848), 
Joseph Haven (1857), James Rush (1865), Noah Porter (1868), and others of this era drew largely 
on the Scottish common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. 
10
 For example, 
Upham's Abridgement of Mental Philosophy (1861), which drew together ideas developed in his 
earlier books, built on Scottish philosophy in recognizing three main components of the mind: the 
intellect, the sensibilities, and the will. The intellect relies on both external and internal sources of 
knowledge to allow one to understand the world. The external source is experience, as in the earlier 
empirical philosophy of John Locke and David Hume; however, purely empirical knowledge is, as 
Hume had shown, incapable of certainty—so long as we rely entirely on our senses, we must remain 
unsure whether we know the truth about the world. Reid and Stewart, like Kant, found this conclusion 
unpalatable, and they proposed that the mind comes equipped with certain internal forms of 
knowledge, which they called suggestions or intuitions. This internal knowledge provides a certainty 
for human understanding that was congenial to the orthodox religious beliefs of American mental 
philosophers, many of whom were ordained Protestant ministers, preaching the certain truths of 
Christianity from their pulpits on Sunday and teaching the principles of intellectual inquiry in their 
classrooms during the week. Indeed, one of their aims was to show how an understanding of the 
mind could help provide moral guidance to students and the general public. The typical 
undergraduate curriculum during these years included a final-year course on mental and moral 
philosophy taught by the president of the college, and most of the psychological texts from this period 
had their origin in notes prepared for such courses.
11 
 
The skepticism of Hume's philosophy, and of empiricism generally, was not the only intellectual 
challenge faced by 19th-century writers on psychological topics. Charles Darwin's Origin of Species 
was published in London in 1859 and, within a few months, the New York publishing house Appleton 
brought out an American edition. There was a variety of responses to Darwin's evolutionary theory.
12
 
Whereas some, such as Louis Agassiz, the eminent Harvard zoologist whose Amazonian expedition 
the young William James would join in 1865,
13
 rejected Darwinism entirely, others looked for ways 
to fit the theory of evolution into the framework of their religious beliefs. Evolution itself, of course, 
was not a new idea. Robert Chambers's Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) had 
already ruffled a generation of orthodox religious feathers, and the ideas of Lamarck (1809) had been 
at least vaguely known in America for much longer, primarily through the writings of Herbert 
Spencer.
14
 Darwin's theory, however, elicited a much broader and deeper rethinking of philosophical 
and scientific positions, and that rethinking provided the intellectual context within which American 
scholars wrote on animal psychology, and its relationship to the human mind, during and immediately 
after the Civil War. 
 
Theistic Evolution: The Intellectual Context for Comparative Psychology 
The famous debate between Thomas Henry Huxley—"Darwin' s bulldog," as he was known—and 
Bishop Samuel ("Soapy Sam") Wilberforce shortly after the publication of the Origin has become an 
unfortunate emblem of 19th-century arguments over evolution in general and Darwinism in 
particular. James R. Moore
15
 noted the tendency to cast these arguments in military terms, and the 
Huxley–Wilberforce debate has all the elements of a stirring military engagement. However, as Moore 
explained in careful detail, the responses to Darwin were far more complex, and more interesting, than 
the military metaphor implies. Moore called one group of respondents the "Christian 
Darwinisticists"
16
—Christians who agreed with some, though not all, of Darwin's arguments but 
needed to find ways to preserve the central truths of their religion in the face of his theory. These writers 
agreed with Darwin that the living world has come into being in accordance with natural law, 
perhaps including the mechanism of natural selection. However, they also believed that divine 
agency contributed to evolutionary change, a position known as theistic evolutionism.
17 
 
The starting point of the theistic criticism, that Darwin had his finger on some but not all of the truth, 
was not, it should be noted, exclusively a religious position. There were plenty of purely scientific 
questions to be asked about the details of Darwin's theory: How do variations in structure and 
function arise? What are the mechanisms of heredity that ensure successful variants will breed true 
through many generations? Is natural selection supplemented by other mechanisms, such as the inherited 
effects of habit? If so, how do the other mechanisms operate, and how important are they? All these 
questions and more were debated by scientists in the decades following 1859, often without any 
reference to religious issues. The theists, however, although concerned to sort out the scientific puzzles 
surrounding the theory of natural selection, also believed that a place had to be found for divine 
influence—otherwise, they feared, Darwinism would indeed lead to atheism, as the anti-
evolutionists claimed. 
 
There were several theistic objections to Darwinism.
18
 Foremost among them was that it proposed the 
development of different species to have resulted from a purely mechanical process, natural selection, 
with no room for divine influence of any kind. Even for many who were willing to accept that the 
world and all its occupants had not been created in a single 6-day period, the idea that God had 
played no role at all in the production of living things was unacceptable. A second objection was that 
Darwinism seemed to entail materialism, the belief that the world consists of nothing except matter, 
leaving no room for soul or spirit. Darwin had deliberately side-stepped the evolution of the human 
species in 1859, although he dropped hints that his theory was intended to apply to the human as 
well as all other living species. In 1871, he published The Descent of Man, which filled that gap and 
made it clear that his evolutionary theory was intended to explain the mental and moral evolution 
of the human species as well as its physical development.
19
 Thus Christians were being asked to 
believe not only that God had played no role in the creation of the natural world but also that the human 
soul, the divinely implanted source of human intellectual and moral understanding, was a mere 
fiction. 
 
Theistic evolutionists dealt with these implications of Darwinism in a variety of ways, of which two 
in particular should be noted. The first was to assert that although mechanical processes play some 
role in evolutionary development, the course of that development follows a divinely established 
plan—it is not the result of purely mechanical selection acting on purely fortuitous variation, as 
Darwin had proposed. The second was to insist that the human soul stands in some sense apart from 
the material world. The theistic reaction against materialism was not solely a response to Darwin, 
although his theory was widely understood to have materialist implications. The epithet "materialism" 
was already being directed at Auguste Comte' s positive philosophy, which had reached America in 
1853 in the form of Harriet Martineau's English translation and condensation.
20
 Comte insisted that 
all knowledge, philosophical as well as scientific, must be based on observable fact, a position that left 
no room for a spiritual understanding of the unobservable soul. The terms materialist and positivist 
were often used interchangeably, and the theists found both positions equally objectionable. 
 
Because natural selection was the most objectionable feature of Darwinism, theists were attracted to 
evolutionary positions that emphasized other mechanisms of evolutionary change, the most 
obvious of which was Lamarckism. In Lamarck' s theory, evolution occurs as a result of two 
processes: a tendency toward complexity and perfection that is inherent in all living matter and a 
series of adaptations to local circumstances, accomplished by the inherited effects of use and disuse.
21
 
In the decades after 1859, American scientists were drawn more and more strongly to the 
Lamarckian perspective, for a variety of reasons, at least one of which was its greater compatibility 
with the theistic perspective. The inherent perfecting tendency could readily be seen as the 
manifestation of a divine evolutionary plan, and the inherited effects of use and disuse made it 
unnecessary to rely on fortuitous variation to explain adaptation to circumstances: Each species could 
improve its situation as the individual accomplishments of successive generations accumulated in 
the germ. Around the turn of the century, American science would come to wholeheartedly embrace 
a neo-Lamarckian perspective that persisted until about 1920.
22
 In the decades immediately after the 
publication of the Origin, that had not yet happened, but there was widespread interest in and sympathy 
for the Lamarckian position. Indeed, as many historians have pointed out, Herbert Spencer's 
Lamarckian evolutionism was far more popular in America than in England, and many of the most 
prominent American advocates of an evolutionary perspective, such as Edward L. Youmans, John 
Fiske, and Henry Ward Beecher, advocated a Spencerian rather than a Darwinian outlook.
23 
 
In this article I examine the work of three American scholars from the middle and late 19th century 
who applied a theistic perspective to questions about the relationship between human and animal 
minds and so opened a door to the study of comparative psychology: the anthropologist Lewis Henry 
Morgan, the philosopher and educator John Bascom, and the geologist and popularizer of evolution-
ary theory Joseph LeConte. Although none of them seemed to have directly influenced the 
development of the discipline during the last decade of the 19th century, for reasons I discuss at the 
end of this article all of them were thinkers whose ideas are well worth understanding in their own 
right, and at least some of their ideas anticipate those of later writers whose contributions are much 
better known. The three are roughly contemporaneous (they were all born within a 9-year 
period), and all achieved considerable success in fields other than psychology. Together they constitute 
a interesting and neglected chapter in the history of American comparative psychology. 
 
Lewis Henry Morgan (1818 —1881) 
Lewis Morgan was born near Aurora, New York, in 1818, one of eight children of Jedediah 
Morgan and his second wife, Harriett Steele.
24
 Jedediah was a prosperous farmer and, although he 
died when Lewis was 8, he left his wife and family well provided for. Lewis attended Aurora 
Academy, where he studied classics, then in 1838 entered Union College in Schenectady, New York, 
to study law, at which time he added Henry to his name. Morgan graduated in 1840 and was 
admitted to the bar, but he was unable to find employment for another 3 years, during which time he 
managed the family farm and read widely, amassing a large private library.
25
 With a group of friends, 
he founded the "Order of the Gordian Knot," a fraternal organization devoted to discussion and 
fellowship, one of several such organizations with which he would be associated during his life. He 
began the practice of law in Rochester in 1844, by which time he had written several essays for 
literary periodicals, including "Mind or Instinct: An Inquiry Concerning the Manifestation of Mind by 
the Lower Orders of Animals,"
26
 one of four articles he published in The Knickerbocker in 1843-
1844. 
 
The theme of Morgan's 1843 article was that the mental abilities of animals 
 
PICTURE  IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
 
are the same in kind as those of humans, although they may differ in degree. In particular, he argued 
that explaining the actions of animals by appeal to something called instinct and those of man by 
appeal to something different, called mind, is an unwarranted distinction. We have no direct knowledge 
of the nature of instinct, Morgan said, and so must rely on indirect evidence, but of course, the same is 
true of our understanding of mind: 
 
Our knowledge of the qualities of instinct is derived from actions only; of mind from words and actions. But 
these qualities can be inferred as legitimately from the latter [i.e., actions], under proper restrictions, as from 
both; and if we should investigate the properties of mind from the actions of men exclusively, we could not arrive 
at them with any greater certainty than we can at the properties of instinct. (p. 416) 
So in understanding the nature of both mind and instinct, we must base our conclusions on the study of 
behavior and accept the limitations thus imposed on the certainty with which we can draw our 
conclusions. Morgan then proceeded to describe observations that he believed demonstrate the 
existence in animals of mental abilities popularly supposed to be unique to humans: memory, 
imagination, abstraction, and reasoning. The examples he provided were drawn from works of 
natural history, in particular Buffon's Histoire Naturelle (which appeared in 44 volumes between 
1749 and 1804), published and unpublished reports of isolated examples of animal behavior, and 
even classical sources such as Aesop's Fables and Pliny's Natural History. On the basis of his evidence, 
Morgan concluded that animals have all of the capabilities mentioned above, developed in some cases 
to at least as high a degree as we see in humans: 
 
No shade of distinction can be taken, except it be in the degree of strength; and on these terms, while the mass of 
animals would fall below man, some would rise above him. (p. 416) . . . . We are forced to see the analogies 
between the manifestations of mind and of instinct; and any candid observer will find it as difficult to detect a 
distinction, (except in the degree of power), as to prove that these analogies do not exist. (p. 419) 
 
The first part of Morgan's article (published in the November 1843 issue) covered memory, 
abstraction, and imagination; the second part (published the following month) dealt with reasoning 
and judgment. His examples were drawn from the behavior of many species, particularly the beaver, 
which is interesting in light of his book on that animal published 25 years later and discussed further 
below.
27
 Morgan argued that beavers demonstrate abstraction in the selection of sites for constructing 
dams, which requires that the animal take account of several factors, such as the width and depth of the 
stream, the height of the banks, and the availability of suitable trees. If any one of these characteristics is 
missing, then the project will fail, leading to the conclusion "that they had abstractly considered 
these elements of fitness, before they selected this site, in preference to another" (p. 417). Once 
again, Morgan urged that the same logic be used to infer the mental ability of animals as would be 
used in the case of human performance: 
 
Judging from actions, (to which we are confined), the manifestations of instinct in the cases cited, are exactly 
analogous to the manifestations of mind, under similar circumstances; and had man exhibited such conduct, we should 
without hesitation pronounce it the consequence of abstract consideration. Now, since we know nothing of the 
ultimate nature of mind, or of instinct, and hence cannot establish a fundamental distinction between them; and 
since the manifestations of both are alike, in view of similar premises; it follows, that we can no more deny the 
quality of abstraction to one than to the other. (p. 418) 
 
Under the heading of imagination, he considered play, birdsong, dreaming (demonstrated by the 
twitches and sounds of a sleeping dog), and migration; in the last case, he suggested that birds would 
not migrate unless they had "images of other regions, more beautiful, more abundantly supplied 
with the means of subsistence, and more agreeable in climate" (p. 419). Imagination depends on 
perception, and here again we see an analogy between humans and animals—both have similar 
anatomical systems (retina, optic nerve, and brain) that allow them to obtain knowledge of 
external objects. "The modes thus far are perfectly analogous; but here inquiry has rested" (p. 420); 
instead of drawing the logical conclusion that animals, like humans, can reason on the basis of 
information provided by the senses, animal behavior has been attributed to instinct, "a blind, 
unfathomable impulse." 
 
The second part of Morgan's paper dealt at length with the question of animal reason, using examples 
similar to those that would be used 40 years later by the English naturalist George J. Romanes.
28
 
These included a fox that, having entered a henhouse and gorged itself on chickens, cannot escape 
through the small hole by which it entered; when the farmer arrives next morning, the fox feigns 
death and then escapes when the farmer carries him out and throws him on the ground (p. 507). 
Another example was that of marmots that, having cut grass for nesting, pile it on the belly of one 
member of the group who lies on his back, his legs in the air "to make greater room," and allows 
himself to be dragged by the tail back to the burrow (p. 508). Fanciful as these examples are, they 
are no more absurd than many offered by Romanes and other naturalists half a century later. Less 
fanciful examples include animals that store food for the winter (which shows foresight) and an 
instance of what is actually discriminative conditioning in a nesting bird offered to demonstrate the 
power of reasoning. 
 
Morgan gave animal construction (including, once again, beaver dams) special emphasis, with an 
interesting twist on William Paley's argument from design
29
 to prove the existence, not of divine 
but of animal intelligence: 
 
If the argument of Paley is sound, that contrivance forms design, and from design we infer intelligence, it applies 
with emphasis to all constructed animal habitations. . . Contrivance and construction seem to be impossible without 
the constant exercise of a reflecting principle; while economy of labor and time indicates the correctness with which 
this principle directs the conduct. (p. 511) 
 
Morgan's conclusion was that animals possess just the same range of mental abilities as humans, 
although with different degrees of development. His account of the similarities between humans and 
animals was not an evolutionary one (publication of the Origin of Species lay 16 years in the 
future)—mental abilities were "created by the Deity, and bestowed in such measures upon the 
different species as appeared in His wisdom requisite for the destiny and happiness of each" (p. 
514). Nonetheless, he considered instinct to be unnecessary and indeed useless for explaining animal 
behavior: 
 
To pronounce all these phenomena the workings of instinct, a name without a tangible meaning; a designation 
that prohibits inquiry, because it pretends to furnish an explanation of itself; would be to rest for ever in profound 
ignorance of the whole subject, when truth might be reached by an investigation. (p. 514) 
 
This is an early version of what would later become known as the anti-instinct position, some 80 
years before it was reformulated by Knight Dunlap and Zing-Yang Kuo.
30 
 
In light of Morgan's later, and much better known work in anthropology,
3
1 it is interesting that his 
1843 paper includes a number of references to primitive human societies, all making the general 
point that when one looks only at behavior one may be hard pressed to distinguish between that of the 
highest forms of animal and of the lowest form of man. The paper opens with the following paragraph: 
 
The cultivation of the intellectual endowment of man has raised him to such a degree above the other orders of 
animated existence, that he claims the exclusive possession of the Thinking Principle; forgetting, while he surveys the 
monuments of human intelligence, that they are but the evidence of his advancement from the savage state; and that 
while he remained in that primitive condition he might be considered, in fact, as many degrees below his present 
position in point of mental capacity, as above that of the most sagacious animals; forgetting also that had he continued in 
a state of nature, like some of the tribes of Africa or America, leaving others to judge of his intelligence from the 
rude vestiges of his civilization exclusively, they could scarcely attribute to him more intellect than they would to 
the beaver, or even to the ant. (p. 414) 
 
The accomplishments of civilization, he was saying, do not depend on any special mental capabilities 
that set mankind above other animals. They depend instead on development in human society that has 
taken place from some earlier state of savagery. This is a position that Morgan would develop at much 
greater length later in his career.
32 
 
In the years following the publication of his first essays in The Knickerbocker, Morgan established his 
law practice and developed his growing interest in American Indian culture. He changed the name 
of his fraternal club, the "Order of the Gordian Knot," to the "Grand Order of the Iroquois," with an 
organization modeled on Iroquois customs. He became involved in Indian affairs and began collecting 
the information on Iroquois customs, governance, and family structure that formed the basis for his 
great ethnographic work, The League of the Iroquois.
33
 In 1855, Morgan made the first of 
several trips to the Midwest in connection with his position as a director of the Iron Mountain 
Rail Road Company, which he and a group of associates had founded to build a railroad for transporting 
iron ore from the Upper Peninsula of Michigan to ports on Lakes Superior and Michigan. His friend 
Gilbert Johnson, a mining superintendent, introduced him to the pleasures of trout fishing during 
these trips, and Morgan spent many hours not only fishing but also observing the habits of the large beaver 
population in the region.
34
 Although Morgan described his observations on beavers as if they 
were incidental to the fishing trips with his friend, the prominence given to their behavior in his 
1843 Knickerbocker article supports Trautmann' s suggestion that the animal already occupied a 
significant place in Morgan's thinking.
35
 If one were looking for evidence of an almost-human 
intelligence among animals, as it seems that Morgan was, the beaver would be a very attractive 
choice of species to study. Over the next several years, Morgan described and measured the 
constructions of beavers, collected and dissected beaver carcasses (with the assistance of Dr. 
William W. Ely, a Rochester physician), and secured the services of a photographer to make accurate 
engravings of dams and other constructions. In 1861 and 1862 he supplemented his Michigan 
observations with trips to watch beavers near the Hudson Bay in Canada, and in 1868 he published a 
book-length account of his work in The American Beaver and His Works (see note 24). 
 
The book was the first attempt by an American author to write the comprehensive natural history of a 
single species, and is still occasionally cited in the literature on beaver ecology and behavior.
36
 In it, 
Morgan described the general characteristics and taxonomy of the beaver, its anatomy and feeding 
habits, and methods of trapping it, but most of the book (four of nine chapters) deals with beavers' 
constructions, including dams, burrows, lodges, trails, and canals. Morgan included measurements 
of dams, maps showing their placement on streams and rivers, sketches of their construction, and 
engravings made from photographs taken in the field of dams, ponds, and lodges. The book was well 
received by reviewers for the American Naturalist, The Atlantic Monthly, The Nation, and The 
North American Review.
37
 None of the reviews, however, paid much attention to the book' s final 
chapter, titled "Animal Psychology." 
 
This chapter presents a wide-ranging discussion of animal psychology, drawing on Morgan's 
observations of beavers but including many other species as well. It is based on an unpublished 
manuscript by the same title that Morgan read on April 7, 1857, to the Pundit Club, an organization 
that he had founded in 1854 as a forum for scholarly discussion.
38
 The two works include many of the 
same arguments and examples, and both follow the same general organization; Morgan's thinking 
on these matters does not appear to have undergone significant change between 1857 and 1868. 
Both works have the same goal as his earlier article: to argue that animal and human psychology 
involve the same mental processes and that the term instinct has very little use in our understanding 
of either. His 1857 manuscript opens with a call for the serious study of animal psychology and 
another denunciation of instinct: 
 
The endowments of animals have, in all ages of the world, excited discussion; but this discussion has neither 
inaugurated a science, nor offered any exposition of the intellectual life of the lower orders of animals, in the least 
degree satisfactory. There are difficulties however, one of which, and a very serious one, is the want of a 
sufficient knowledge of their habits; another may be found in the abysmal nature of all intellectual science; but 
a greater than either arises from that stupendous blunder as well as fraud upon the animal races, the introduction of 
the term "instinct." We have here a system of philosophy in a deffinition [sic]; we have an installation of the 
supernatural, which silences at once all inquiry into the facts.
39 
 
In this manuscript Morgan did not entirely deny the existence of instincts, but he insisted that the term 
should be applied only to those acts, in both humans and animals, that are entirely involuntary and 
performed without any "anterior mental processes"; that is, without being the result of any reasoning or 
judgment.
40
 He objected that the term was applied far too broadly and uncritically to the behavior of 
animals, or Mutae, as he called them, 
 
leaving each [writer] to concede reasoning powers to the Mutae in such measure and degree or none at all as his 
mere fancy may dictate. It is impossible therefore to assign to the endowments of animals any fixed place in the 
intellectual scale, while we recognize the principle of instinct as at present defined.
41
 
  
The bulk of both the manuscript and the later chapter is devoted to arguing, as he had done in 1843, 
that animals possess the same mental abilities as humans, although developed to different degrees. His 
argument throughout is the same: If certain behavior is evidence for a particular mental power (such 
as reason) in humans, then similar behavior must be taken as evidence for the same mental power in 
animals. In his 1843 paper he suggested that one cannot even deny animals a moral sense, although 
in the 1868 chapter he was more circumspect, saying that this claim "is without support in existing 
knowledge."
42
 He did, however, hint that if a mental principle is assigned to animals, then they must 
be granted all the properties usually attached to the mind, including perhaps even the immortality of the 
soul.
43
 He also put humans and animals on the same moral plane in another respect, arguing that 
humans should be more considerate of animal rights (even to the extent of advocating 
vegetarianism),
44
 whether out of a respect for their independent existence or out of a more enlightened 
sense of our own self-interest: 
 
When the Creator made man omnivorous, He designed his use of animal food. It is not sentimentalism but rather 
sense, to say that he should exercise that right with reason and forbearance. . . . If we recognize the fact that the 
mutes possess a thinking, and reasoning, and perhaps an immortal principle, our relations to them will appear to 
us in a different, and in a better light.
45 
 
Morgan acknowledged that a large gap exists between the abilities of the most primitive human races 
and the most advanced animals, and at one point he speculated "that some intermediate species, and 
perhaps several of them, have dropped out in the course of the early ages, or that some existing 
species have been degraded beyond redemption."
46
 This remark should not be taken to suggest that 
Morgan was entertaining the idea of evolutionary intermediates between humans and animals; in all 
of his writings there is nothing to imply that he ever questioned the doctrine of special creation. It is 
clear that he thought in terms of a beneficent God who equipped each species with the mental powers 
it needed to live in the way for which He had designed it. 
Most of Morgan's writings dealt with anthropology rather than animal psychology, and it is for his 
anthropological contributions that he is mainly remembered today (see note 28). The League of the 
Iroquois (1851) is considered to be the first ethnographic work on American Indians, and its 
publication was followed by a number of articles and two major works: Systems of Consanguinity 
and Affinities of the Human Family (1871) and Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of 
Human Progress from Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization (1877).
47
 Neither of these 
deals with "mutes," but they bear mention because both took what Morgan understood to be an 
evolutionary approach to the history of human societies. Despite his belief in the separate divine 
creation of species, both human and nonhuman, Morgan claimed that within the human species there 
has been a progressive elaboration of social organization through history. In his writing on 
animals, Morgan had already pointed out that human knowledge accumulates from generation to 
generation, and he left open the possibility that the same might be true in animals as well. The 
behavior of domesticated animals, he thought, indicates that such progress is possible and might 
involve the inherited effects of habit.
48
 His later anthropological works (especially Ancient 
Society) develop the idea of human social progress at great length, but for Morgan such change had 
occurred only within the human species; there had been no transformation of one species into 
another.
49
 To call Morgan's anthropology "evolutionary" is true only in a very limited sense of 
that term; certainly there is no indication that his comparative psychology had an evolutionary 
dimension. 
 
After 1868, Morgan wrote nothing substantial on animal psychology. He reviewed Paul A. 
Chadbourne's book on instinct for The Nation, criticizing Chadbourne for ignoring natural history 
observations in favor of an exclusively "metaphysical" (i.e., theoretical) discussion.
50
 He repeated 
his view that instinct does not explain behavior, although he would admit its use "to distinguish 
unconscious from conscious processes of mind. Beyond this we believe the term should be totally 
rejected both in relation to men and to animals" (p. 192). Morgan urged the continued accumulation of 
facts about natural history: 
 
The time is not far distant when these facts concerning the endowment of animals will be subject to scientific 
treatment upon the basis of the facts themselves. It may be doubtful whether this knowledge is now sufficiently 
thorough and minute to establish a science of animal psychology. (p. 192) 
 
Until then, he suggested, the instinct hypothesis, which he thought was "certain to break down 
from the weight of its own incongruities," should be abandoned. 
 
John Bascom (1827-1911) 
Unlike Morgan, who never held a university position, John Bascom was a professional scholar and 
teacher, although his scholarly work is now perhaps less well remembered than that of his fellow New 
Yorker. Bascom was born in Genoa, Cayuga County, New York, in 1827. His father, also John 
Bascom, was a Congregationalist minister who died when John was an infant, and he was raised by 
his mother and three older sisters.
51
 John wanted to attend Yale; his family urged him to go to 
Hamilton, and he compromised by attending Williams College, where his father and uncles had been 
educated. After graduating in 1849, he spent a year teaching, which he hated, then went to Rochester 
to study law,
52
 at least in part in reaction against family pressure to enter the ministry. He enjoyed the 
study of law, but not the practice, which lacked the logic and rationality that he had expected. In 
1851 he decided to pursue a more intellectual course and entered Auburn Theological Seminary, 
drawn by the presence of Laurens Perseus Hickok, whose Rational Psychology (1848) was one of the 
first books by an American author to use the word psychology in its title.
53 
 
Hickok's intellect and personality had a strong influence on the young Bascom; he was 
beginning to question the strict Puritanism of his upbringing,
54
 and in Hickok he found a man of 
"great intellectual and spiritual powers." He described the months of study with him as 
 
the most delicious and exhilarating of any that I have ever known. . . . I felt the safety of a strong man guiding my 
thoughts in new and bold research. . . . Doubt and uncertainty were as much in order as belief, and the mind was 
trained to take possession with cautious conviction of its own captures. 
 
Bascom clearly found Hickok's questioning approach toward religious matters congenial; 
although a devout man throughout his life, Bascom clearly preferred the intellectualism of the 
seminary to the religiosity of the pulpit. Indeed, he wanted to become a professor of theology but 
doubted he could find acceptance within any established church. In the preface to his 
autobiography he wrote, "My life has been unusually rational" and noted that Mark Hopkins, 
president of Williams College, "once said to me . . . that my preaching had not a particle of 
religious power." 
55
 After a year at Auburn, Bascom returned to Williams, where he worked as a 
tutor for 2 years. He completed his seminary training at Andover in 1854 and then accepted a 
professorship at Williams to teach rhetoric and oratory. One of Bascom's students at Williams 
was G. Stanley Hall, who later obtained the first American doctorate in psychology under 
William James at Harvard. Hall entered the college as a freshman in 1867 and in his 
autobiography acknowledged Bascom as the teacher to whom he owed the most during his 
undergraduate years.
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PICTURE IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
 
At Williams, Bascom wrote a number of books on an impressive array of subjects, mainly because 
of his dissatisfaction with the texts available for his teaching. In 1869, he published Principles of 
Psychology, which he described as the first book he wrote "simply and singly from my interest 
in the subject considered."
57
 In this book Bascom presented an intuitionalist psychology, based on 
Scottish common-sense philosophy but including Kantian ideas derived from his mentor, Laurens 
Hickok.
58
 The book follows the traditional organization of 19th-century works on mental 
philosophy, dividing the operations of mind into three categories: the intellect (Book I), the feelings 
(Book II), and the will (Book III). The book's introduction acknowledges the value of considering 
the human mind as a part of the natural world and hints at the comparative perspective that would 
become apparent in Bascom's later psychological writings as he developed more fully his theistic 
view of evolutionary change: 
 
The forces and lives of the world grade up to [man], and grade down from him; and while he is the highest 
and latest of living things, he is nevertheless of them, ruling by superiority, not by a complete separation of 
nature.
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Bascom did not advocate naturalistic Darwinism; on the contrary, his comparative approach, here and in 
all his later works, was suffused with theism and with a belief in the separateness of the mind and 
spirit from the material body: 
 
Approaching man from below, we interpret him from the types of power we find in nature, we limit his 
liberty or rob him of it . . . while we seem to find the germ and outline of his intellectual constitution in brute 
instincts, perceptions, associations. We are thus as those who contemplate in a statue more the pedestal on 
which it rests ... than the living, spiritual power it expresses. (p. 3)  
 
The longest discussion of animal psychology, almost 10 pages, occurs at the end of Book I, on the 
intellect (p. 219-228). Bascom accepted that because direct knowledge of the animal mind is impossible, 
his discussion would be "necessarily somewhat theoretical" (p. 219), but he proposed to seek "the 
simplest explanation of the facts, with the least assumptions, and the fewest forces [i.e., mental 
abilities]." In his view, there is no evidence for, and no need to invoke, higher intellectual powers in 
animals. "Sensation, perception, memory and imagination, evidently belong to the higher animals, and 
by these faculties, we believe, all the intellectual phenomena they present can be readily explained" 
(p. 219). He cautioned against making anthropocentric interpretations of animal behavior by drawing 
too close an analogy with one's own conscious experience. Although animals do sometimes engage 
in what seems to be reasoned, deliberate action, he said, "Keen perception and quick association by 
an active, retentive memory offer a complete explanation of the facts involved . . . without 
supposing the presence of a single act of judgment" (p. 221). He then went on, using an analysis 
similar to those offered by C. Lloyd Morgan and Edward L. Thorndike a quarter century later,
60
 to show 
how even quite complex behavior by animals can be explained in simple terms; for example: 
 
A cow learns to open a gate; but how? First, by accidentally or impatiently rubbing her head and horns against it, 
and thus loosening the latch. This process, repeated once or twice, establishes a connection between the act and its 
results, and later, when she wishes to be free, she worries the gate open again. A change of fastening relieves the 
difficulty, not because the new method of reaching the latch is necessarily impossible to her, but because it is not 
accomplished by the same blind movement which removed from the catch the previous one. . . . That the protracted 
experience of the brute must yield to it not very unfrequently a repeated concurrence of the same cause and effect, 
and thus enable it to reach the one through the other, in those cases in which appetite impresses on the memory the 
connection, is obvious. (p. 221-222) 
 
In the rest of this section, Bascom discussed some principles of animal training (including—to use 
modern terminology—difficulties encountered in the early stages of shaping a new response, the 
adverse effects of harsh punishment, and the importance of temporal contiguity in conditioning) and 
suggested that apparent instances of counting in animals can probably be explained by a purely 
perceptual ability to discriminate among different small numbers of objects. He cautioned against 
uncritical acceptance of exceptional examples of animal intelligence, warning that 
 
these examples require more searching inquiry as to their exact form and value than they have received, as the 
shades of action that distinguish association and reflection are unobtrusive and delicate; and few are aware of the 
extent of results easily within the scope of association alone[,] (p. 225) 
 
a passage that might easily have been written, in a different idiom, by John B. Watson in the 
1920s or B. F. Skinner in the 1950s. Of course, Bascom did not share the theoretical and 
experimental context of these much later writers, and it is important not to attribute too much 
prescience to his words. Nonetheless, this passage demonstrates his appreciation of the necessity 
for controlled investigation of animals' mental abilities, the tools for which would only become 
available some two decades later. 
 
Two years after the publication of Principles of Psychology, Bascom revisited the question of the 
animal mind in an article entitled "Instinct," published in 1871 in the religious periodical Bibliotheca 
Sacra, to which he was a frequent contributor.
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 In this article, he reiterated and extended the points he 
had made earlier in Principles and added further arguments to support his position that animals do not 
reason. In Principles he had made a proposal that anticipated at least the sense, if not the form, of 
Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which states that one should not use a more complex mental ability to 
explain animal behavior if a simpler one will do: "Why is not the opposite supposition of reasoning an 
admissible one? We answer, because it involves at once the entire circle of regulative ideas; postulates 
more powers than are needed to explain the phenomena."
62
 In this later article he restated the 
proposal in terms even closer to Lloyd Morgan's, by urging that, in general, "the least sufficient 
cause for any class of facts is the one to be accepted"
63
 and going on to argue that in explaining 
animal behavior: 
 
Our conclusions must rest, not on a few detached and extreme instances, but on the general appearance and character of 
the phenomena under discussion. The aspect of animal life, as a whole, should have more weight in forming our 
opinions than rare cases of sagacity. If the explanation we bring to these seems to any a little forced, this is better 
than to assign exaggerated and disproportionate causes to the bulk of the facts before us. It is more rational to suppose 
that a given set of powers should sometimes accomplish what at first sight seems beyond them, than to suppose that 
another set of powers should habitually do far less than belongs to them; that brute faculties should make an 
occasional leap than that human faculties should lie unawakened on the low level of brute attainment.
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The "brute faculties" include those of perception, memory, and learning that he had discussed 
previously, together with the possibility that the effects of learning might be inherited by subsequent 
generations; to these, however, Bascom now added instinct, which he had barely mentioned in his 
earlier work. He recognized three classes of phenomena in living things: vital functions (such as 
breathing and digestion), sensitive functions (involving direct connections between the senses and 
action), and judgment or thought.
65
 Instinct "has a basis, more or less obscure, in the physical state 
of the animal" and involves both the vital and the sensory functions—it stands midway between the 
completely unconscious, vital functions, such as breathing and digestion, and voluntary action based 
on reason. Some instinctive acts, such as those involved in feeding or reproduction, may be 
connected with specific organs, and many are elicited by particular sensory inputs. 
 
He pointed out that some of the most complex forms of animal behavior are found among the insects, 
such as web-building by spiders and comb-building by bees. If one were to attribute them to reason, 
one would be granting to these very simple animals mental abilities superior even to those of most 
humans, and one would also need to explain how it is that the rational power that allows a bee to 
calculate the complex geometry of its comb cannot be applied in other domains as well. 
Furthermore, these behaviors often depend on the animal's physical constitution (such as the spider's 
ability to produce two kinds of silk for web construction), suggesting that the behavior itself may 
have a constitutional basis as well. Bascom also made the interesting point that even purely physical 
systems can display complex patterns of regularity that cannot be attributed to rational powers: "The 
waves on the beach work out some fine mathematical forms; they are not therefore 
geometricians."
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In Bascom's view, there is a close connection between instinct and other forms of action, making 
it difficult, for example, to distinguish between an instinctive act and one that is the result of long 
practice and experience. He also pointed out that an instinctive act may still be susceptible to extensive 
control and modification by the senses. He took issue with Alfred R. Wallace's suggestion that nest-
building in birds is not instinctive but, like much human construction, the result of imitation and 
tradition,
67
 arguing instead that the behavior results from a blending of instinct and experience: 
 
If, however, we recognize the presence and modifying power of the senses, and also the instinctive, 
constructive impulse, both moving toward a common end in an inseparable way, we shall be able readily to 
include, on the one side, the various material and modifications of the nest; on the other, the certainty and 
completeness of the general pattern. 
 
Bascom dismissed the evidence that Lewis Morgan had advanced in favor of animal reason, arguing, 
once again, that parsimony requires us to exhaust simpler explanations before invoking more complex 
ones. He also denied that attributing an animal's behavior to instinct requires us to invoke some 
supernatural power, as Morgan had suggested. Instinct, as Bascom understood it, is rooted in the physical 
constitution of the animal and would eventually be understood in physical terms. 
 
Bascom's paper had been written before the publication of Darwin's Descent of Man (1871), but he 
added a short section at the end taking issue with Darwin's attribution of reason to animals and with his 
assertion that the human moral sense can be understood in purely utilitarian terms, as an assessment 
of the likely consequences for the individual of taking this or that course of action. If this were so, 
Bascom said, "then certainly we are content to find its rudiments in the dog. We disagree with 
Darwin, not in making brutes lower than he does, but in making men much higher."
68
 This is not quite 
accurate, because Bascom clearly argued that animals do not, in fact, possess human powers of reason; 
it is obvious that he wanted to emphasize the spiritual side of human nature and to associate reason 
with the spiritual and moral sense. 
 
In 1874, Bascom accepted the presidency of the University of Wisconsin and moved from 
Williamsburg to Madison, in part because of a growing dissatisfaction with his work at Williams 
and also because he "found that my growing freedom of religious thought was making my 
presence less agreeable to the college."
69
 His position as president at Wisconsin gave him the 
opportunity to teach philosophy, ethics, and related subjects, which he enjoyed. It also allowed him 
to pursue his interest in psychology and in the relation between the animal and the human mind, 
and in 1878 he published Comparative Psychology or, the Growth and Grades of Intelligence.
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Before 1878, numerous books had been published on the behavior of animals, mainly on the topic of 
instinct and most of them taking the perspective of natural theology—the search for evidence of God's 
design in the natural world.
71
 Bascom's treatment of the subject was both more wide ranging than a 
discussion of instinct and, although his religious commitment is clear, had much in common with 
later textbooks of comparative psychology, such as those of George Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, and 
even John B. Watson.
72
 The book begins with a discussion of the relation between mind and matter 
and of the relation between physical and vital (i.e., living) systems. It then surveys the regulative and 
psychological processes found among living things (including plants)
73
 with chapters on instinct, 
association and memory, and reasoning. Only in the last chapter, on "The Supreme Reason," did 
Bascom focus directly on the role of God in the natural world. 
 
Bascom defined comparative psychology as "a knowledge of intelligence, of conscious activity, as it 
exists in all accessible forms of life, a tracing of its development in its several stages through the 
entire animal kingdom."
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 His approach to the subject was evolutionary, but it was the approach of 
theistic rather than naturalistic evolution—the "development" to which he referred has both a material 
and a spiritual component: 
We need, in this inquiry, not only to understand, as well as we may, each form of conscious activity, but its 
immediate nervous conditions, the lower vital and atomic powers on which these are superinduced, and the 
slow increments one upon another, by which all is finally built up into the composite mind of man, the 
crowning spiritual structure of the world; which some hold to have come down from Heaven, and some to 
have sprung from the earth, but which we are ready to believe has, rather, like every living thing, been 
ministered to by each seen and unseen agent, and taken into itself the strength of both realms. (pp. 2-3) 
 
Bascom was deeply skeptical of the ability of materialism to explain mental function, partly because 
of his thoroughgoing belief in a spiritual side to human nature, but also because he did not see how 
materialism could work as a theory. Is it conceivable, he asked (p. 23 ff.), that each and every state 
of mind, every distinct memory, is dependent on an equally distinct state of the brain? "We do not say 
that such a multiplicity of distinct processes in the brain is impossible, but that the supposition is very 
extreme" (p. 25). He preferred to adopt an interactionist view, with mental and physical factors 
"blending and combining in many ways without a loss on the part of either of their distinctive 
natures" (p. 34); unsurprisingly, he did not say precisely how this was to be accomplished. 
 
His skepticism about materialism extended to another problem as well, namely, explaining 
heredity and development.
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 He criticized the idea that purely material particles, such as the gemmules 
postulated by Darwin in his theory of pangenesis,
76
 could be responsible for the complexities of 
structure and function to be found in living things (p. 50 ff.). He thought the theory simply assigned to 
gemmules the very properties of organisms that need to be explained, a criticism that has also been 
leveled at 20th-century explanations of development in terms of genetic programs and blueprints.
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The theory, he said, invests gemmules: 
 
with intelligent powers, in order that matter in molecules, in a way wholly alien to our experience of it in 
masses, may do the work of mind. We retreat with our suppositions into infinitesimals, and so escape 
contradiction. In this region we know nothing and may assume everything. (p. 57) 
 
After a review of the organization of the nervous system through the animal kingdom (chap. 4), 
Bascom discussed progressively more complex forms of regulation and behavior in animals. 
Throughout this discussion, he assessed whether one needs to invoke consciousness to explain the 
phenomena at hand, because consciousness was for him the hallmark of the mental and thus defined 
the range of phenomena of interest to psychological inquiry. He described various reflexive behaviors 
(without using that term) in which, he says, there is no evidence of conscious control. He admitted 
that consciousness may accompany these actions without controlling them but suggested that 
consciousness involves an expenditure of energy and "Hence, natural selection would work against 
this purely wasteful element and eliminate it" (p. 139). In support of that view, he pointed out how 
frequently an initially conscious action may become unconscious as a result of practice until it is 
indistinguishable from reflexive behavior. 
 
Bascom's discussion of instinct (chap. 6) closely followed that presented in his earlier paper. He 
saw it as including "the feeble germs of conscious life" (p. 148) though not as fully conscious. 
Against those who would deny the existence of instinct in animal life, he cited Spalding's 
experimental work
78
 and proceeded to characterize instinctive behavior with the two defining 
features that pervade 19th-century discussions of the topic: instinct is constitutional (i.e., innate), 
and it appears to be intelligent while not in fact involving intelligence or conscious control. 
Instincts are the outcome of evolution—as a result either of natural selection, or of divinely 
predetermined development in particular directions, or of both working together, the kind of theistic 
evolution that Bascom favored (p. 171). Instinct is also important for the evolution of intelligence—it 
lays the groundwork for intelligent control that can gradually take over actions originally instinctive. 
Bascom thought it more likely that instinct precedes intelligence in evolution than that initially 
intelligent behaviors become instinctive—he criticized G. H. Lewes's theory of lapsed 
intelligence
79
 as a general evolutionary explanation, although he accepted that in some cases habits 
may become instinctive because they modify the organic basis of behavior (pp. 172-175). The 
importance of organic modifications in Bascom's discussion of this point should be noted—he did 
not think that purely mental phenomena, such as intelligence, have an organic basis, and so their 
results cannot be inherited through change in the organic structure of the animal. Habit formation is 
different from intelligence because it does involve organic change and so provides a way for 
experience to modify instinct through heredity. The sharp distinction between learning and instinct 
that is the hallmark of 20th-century ethological theory is absent from Bascom's discussion, as 
from most other writings in the late 19th century.
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Bascom gave a straightforward associationist account of learning (chap. 7), suggesting, as Lloyd 
Morgan would do 15 years later, that all animal behavior can be explained on the basis of instinct 
modified and supplemented by association (what Morgan called intelligent modification). Like all 
psychologists of this period, Bascom viewed association as a mental process, not a behavioral one—the 
behavioral view of learning did not emerge in psychology until Thorndike's experimental work and 
Watson's behaviorist reformulation of the problem.
81
 The formation of associations involves three 
elements: appetite (i.e., motivation or drive), sensations, and memory. The first two of these are 
rooted in physical constitution, although with elements of consciousness, but memory is "an abso-
lutely new and a purely mental fact, not . . . the shadow of a physical one" (p. 183). Appetite and 
sensations play dual roles in association, serving not only to make it possible at all but also to allow 
the animal to single out certain things to associate in memory: 
 
Let effects be registered in hungry appetites, lively sensibilities; and let the answering causes be recorded 
in alert senses, and a strong ray of light, falling on each member of the judgment, fastens in memory, and 
the memory holds it tenaciously for future service. (p. 201) 
 
In the remainder of his discussion, Bascom analyzed various instances of apparently rational 
behavior in terms of the combined effects of instinct and association, cautioning repeatedly 
against making too much of isolated reports and against being misled by a superficial 
resemblance between human and animal behavior. 
 
Reason is what separates the human and animal minds. It is reason that allows humans to think about the 
future, whereas animals are restricted to the present— their accommodation to future needs is 
accomplished by instinct, not by reason. Rational thought is assisted by language, which allows 
subtle relations to be identified and appreciated. Throughout his discussion of reason, Bascom 
pointed out ways in which various psychological processes (instinct, habit, association, and 
reason) interact, not always to the individual's advantages. For example, during rational thought, 
associations may lead reason astray, as illustrated by superstitious beliefs found in the "lower races," 
which "have been foisted on the mind by accidental conjunctions" (p. 246). In humans, instinct has 
largely been supplanted by reason and now functions mainly in infancy, before the ability to reason 
has fully developed (p. 245). In Bascom's intuitionalist philosophy, adopted from his mentor 
Laurens Hickok, reasoning is based on clear and necessary truths that are known intuitively, not on 
the basis of experience.
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 The fact that these truths are mental, nonphysical entities means that they 
cannot be transmitted in heredity. On those grounds, he questioned Galton's claim that mental 
ability can be inherited, suggesting instead that the tendency for intellectual accomplishment to run 
in families can be explained as a combination of inherited "organic vigor and fineness of nervous 
structure" with the educational and other opportunities provided by the position of the parents (pp. 
257-258).
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Bascom served as president of the University of Wisconsin for 13 years, resigning in 1887 because 
of political differences with the Board of Regents and returning to Williamstown, where he taught 
again at Williams College. He continued to write, exploring the relations among philosophy, 
evolution, science, and religion that had occupied his attention for so long.
84
 His writings on 
comparative psychology dropped from sight; in his autobiography he wrote, "The book [Comparative 
Psychology], though one of the best I have written, has attracted very little attention,"
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 a statement 
that remains true to the present day. 
 
Joseph LeConte (1823-1901) 
Like Bascom, Joseph LeConte saw the theory of evolution as a great unifying idea entirely 
compatible, if properly conceived, with religious belief. LeConte described himself as a reluctant 
convert to evolution,
86
 although he eventually came to embrace it as "certainly the grandest idea of 
modern science."
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 Born in Liberty County, Georgia, LeConte grew up in the antebellum South, the son 
of a prosperous plantation owner, Louis LeConte, and his wife, Ann Quaterman.
88
 His father was an 
enthusiastic amateur naturalist, and Joseph developed an early interest in the natural world that 
provided a foundation for his subsequent career as a scientist. After graduating from the University 
of Georgia in 1841, he earned a medical degree at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York 
and then returned to Georgia, where he set up a medical practice in Macon. LeConte recognized 
early on that his real interests lay in theoretical science rather than in the practice of medicine, 
and in the fall of 1850 he enrolled in Harvard's Lawrence Scientific School to study with the great 
Swiss zoologist Louis Agassiz, who had joined the Harvard faculty in 1848. LeConte's first taste of 
fieldwork came when he accompanied Agassiz on an expedition to study coral reefs in Florida and 
the two men developed a strong mutual admiration and friendship that lasted until Agassiz's death in 
1873. After 18 months at Harvard, LeConte returned to Georgia. He taught for a year at 
Oglethorpe University and then took a position as Professor of Geology and Chemistry at South 
Carolina College (later the University of South Carolina), where his older brother John was Professor 
of Natural Philosophy. LeConte published several articles in the late 1850s on various scientific 
topics and on education. He left Columbia during the Civil War to attend to his family and property in 
Liberty County; during this trip, his papers and manuscripts were seized and burned by Union 
soldiers. 
 
PICTURE IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
 
After the war, LeConte and his family faced considerable hardship, but he managed to continue 
working when the college reopened, although with a greatly reduced enrollment, and was appointed to 
the Chair of Chemistry, Pharmacy, Mineralogy, and Geology—a daunting array of subjects for one 
man to teach. LeConte became interested in problems of vision and published several articles on 
physiological optics and binocular vision, a body of work that formed the basis for his book Sight, 
published in 1881.
89
 LeConte and his brother John were both opposed to the political and cultural 
changes involved in Reconstruction and urgently sought to move away from the South; by 1868, 
both had received appointments at the newly created University of California in Berkeley. LeConte 
remained in California for the rest of his life and continued to teach and publish into vigorous old 
age. His scientific work, especially in geology, was of the highest caliber (he was elected to the 
presidencies of both the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Geological 
Society of America), and his writings on the relation between religion and the theory of evolution 
were well received by both theologians and scientists in the United States and Europe.
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The comparative approach to psychological problems was central to Le- Conte' s thinking to a 
much greater degree than it was for Morgan or even for Bascom. He wrote no single major work on 
psychology, but his articles demonstrate a continuing concern with problems that would, around the 
turn of the century, become defining issues for the field of comparative psychology: the differences 
between human and animal psychology, the evolution of instinct and intelligence, the role of 
consciousness in behavior, and the role of brain processes in explaining psychological function. He 
applied the principles of evolutionary theory to virtually every domain of inquiry from organic 
chemistry to aesthetics and theology, and he emerges as a comparative scientist of 
remarkable breadth—in LeConte's view, evolutionary theory and comparative methodology hold 
the key to understanding all complex systems, whether they be organisms, minds, or societies. 
 
He first articulated his comparative approach in an early article on the relation between social and 
organic (or biological) science
90
 at a time when he was still very much influenced by Agassiz's 
anti-Darwinian views. After pointing out similarities between the subject matters of biology and 
sociology (e.g., that they both deal with highly differentiated systems that grow and develop), 
LeConte considered the question of their appropriate methodologies. The experimental method 
allows one to simplify a complex physical phenomenon, providing a degree of understanding that 
is impossible using observation alone, but in living things "the forces are so numerous, complex and 
delicately balanced, that we can scarcely touch the organism in the way of experiment, without 
destroying the equilibrium, and, therefore, the very conditions of the problem" (pp. 53-54). 
Fortunately, nature has done this for us: "She has, as it were, prepared the experiment to our 
hands. She has varied the conditions of the problem in every conceivable way, and simplified it to 
the last degree" (p. 54). LeConte identified four series for comparative study: the natural history 
series (i.e., all living species), the embryological series (i.e., the stages of development of 
individuals of any one species), the geological series (i.e., evolutionary history), and the 
pathological series (i.e., natural disruptions produced by disease and accident). True scientific 
understanding, he thought, must draw on all of these: 
 
We may, indeed, have an empirical knowledge of man, or of any other single species or group of species of 
animals, by the simple study of that species or group alone; but true scientific knowledge . . . is impossible 
without thorough knowledge of all organisms, and in all phases of development—in other words, without 
extensive comparison in the four series mentioned above. (p. 55) 
 
This is how social science must advance: "If Sociology ever becomes a true science, it must be 
by the free use of the great method of comparison" (p. 56).  
 
LeConte's scientific publications cover a remarkably wide field, including optics (noted above), 
geology, meteorology, and physiology, in addition to his writings on instinct and intelligence and the 
evolution of mind. He gained an especially wide reputation for his works on the relation between 
evolution and religion, written for both professional and general audiences.
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 As a student of Agassiz's 
in the 1850s, LeConte had originally rejected the possibility of evolutionary change, but as his work 
progressed he gradually became persuaded that the theory was correct; in 1881 he wrote 
 
I frankly avow my belief in evolution as a scientific theory. I have come to this conclusion after much thought and 
at first with much reluctance. As a pupil of Prof. Agassiz, I had deeply sympathized with his views of 
development. It seemed, and still seems, to me a very noble conception; but I now regard evolution by derivation as 
a far nobler conception.
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Indeed, LeConte applied the theory of evolution to far more than just the organic world. He saw 
it as a unifying account of all forms of change— organic, inorganic, social, and psychological—and 
spent much of his career as an enthusiastic advocate for evolutionary thinking.
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 LeConte never thought 
evolution was incompatible with religious belief. In his theistic view, evolution is the means by 
which God has brought about change in the world. Evolution, he wrote, is "one eternal act of 
creation—a never-ceasing procession of divine energy.
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 His efforts to reconcile religion and 
evolution were a manifestation of his constant desire to find unity in apparently opposing points of 
view, something he thought necessary in any inquiry, and he drew on his work on binocular vision 
for a metaphor to illustrate his point: 
 
Thus it happens that in all important philosophic questions there are two opposite, mutually destructive, one-sided 
views; and a third, which combines and reconciles them—which explains their differences by transcending them. 
The first two are opposite surface views; the third stereoscopically combines them into solid reality. This is the true 
test of a rational philosophy.
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In his work on vision, he had briefly addressed a few topics bearing on problems of 
comparative psychology, in particular the relation between inherited capabilities and experience in 
determining depth perception in humans and animals.
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 However, he dealt with these matters in 
much more detail in his 1875 paper on instinct and intelligence. By this time, LeConte was a 
thoroughgoing supporter of evolution, and the paper is suffused with an evolutionary perspective. He 
began by arguing that, although we will never know how brain processes produce psychological 
states, there is nonetheless a correspondence between brain and mind, and it is the job of a scientific 
psychology to study that correspondence. However, he went even further than that: Just as anatomy and 
physiology became truly scientific by becoming comparative, 
 
even so psychology can never assume the rank of a science until it becomes comparative psychology; i.e., until 
it adopts the comparative method, until it studies the different grades and kinds of mentality in their relation to 
each other, and connects them all by the law of evolution.
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Here is an early strong proposal for founding a scientific psychology on evolutionary and 
comparative principles. (Later, he explicitly included the study of development in his prescription 
for a comparative psychology, urging the study of psychology "in relation to those foreshadowings and 
beginnings which we find in the lower animals and in infants."
99
) 
 
With that preamble, LeConte proceeded to discuss the relation between instinct and intelligence in 
animals and humans.
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 He described some features of instinct and intelligence that are similar to 
those given by Morgan and by Bascom as well as other writers of the time. First, intelligence 
depends on experience, whereas instinct is independent of experience: 
 
Like the reflex functions of the nervous system . . . the wisdom and precision of its actions seem to be the result of 
structure, although unlike these, the actions are not removed from the sphere of consciousness and will. 
Second, intelligent behavior is variable and improves with age; instinct is invariant (it "belongs to 
the species") and does not improve with age. If one examined closely the behavior of, for example, 
bees, one would probably see some variations and some improvement, but this is due to the small 
amount of intelligence they possess, not to instinct. Third, instinct is more perfect and unerring than 
intelligence; it is not "liable to mistakes and stumblings and hurtful falls" but is "like the motion of 
an engine laid upon a track which bears it swiftly and surely to its destined goal." The behavior of 
all animals, including man, is determined partly by instinct and partly by intelligence, and the two 
vary in a complementary fashion—where there is more of one, there is less of the other. LeConte 
saw a fairly large discontinuity between the lowest human and the highest animal intelligence and 
the greatest reliance on instinct among animals intermediate in the evolutionary scale, especially 
insects. Like most 19th-century writers on instinct, he was impressed by the complexity of 
presumably instinctive behavior in social insects like ants and bees and tended to use these as 
paradigmatic examples. (In several places here and in other papers he also mentions dam- 
building by beavers as an example of instinct. Although he nowhere cites Lewis H. Morgan by 
name, one can infer that, like Bascom, he would have disagreed with Morgan's attribution of this 
behavior to intelligence.) 
 
Most of the remainder of the paper is devoted to sketching out a Lamarckian theory of the origin 
of instincts. Again, LeConte was clear that evolution must be the unifying principle for 
explaining instinct: 
 
A scientific explanation or theory of instinct must connect it with intelligence on the one hand and the lower 
phenomena of the nervous system on the other—must show how all these several capacities are evolved the one 
from the other—must bring them all under the universal law of evolution. (p. 659) 
 
He distinguished four types of animal action: perfect voluntary movements, habitual movements, 
instinctive movements, and reflex movements. Habits are formed from voluntary movements 
through repetition. Every time an act is repeated, it produces a small change in the brain; if the same 
act is repeated many times, the change becomes deeper and more permanent, "becomes petrified in 
brain-structure. . . . Thus repetition produces structure and structure determines habit" (p. 661). 
This structural change is transmitted in a small degree through inheritance to the next generation, the 
principle of use-inheritance proposed by Lamarck and adopted by Darwin and many other 
evolutionary writers. LeConte gave a detailed illustration of the process as it might have occurred in 
domestic animals that is worth quoting in full: 
 
We know that the instincts of the pointer and the shepherd' s dog have been formed in this way. The great ancestor of 
all pointers, before he was a pointer, was trained with much coaxing and many beatings to do certain things. 
The result was doubtless any thing but satisfactory. Still a habit was formed, and, as we must believe, a 
corresponding brain structure. The pups of this dog were again trained, still with difficulty, but with less difficulty 
than before, because the habit-structure was partially inherited. The best-trained of this generation are selected, 
and their pups again trained. The process is still easier, because the habit-structure is more completely inherited, 
and the result more satisfactory, because the structure is more decided. Thus the improvement goes on from 
generation to generation, until finally, in the purest bloods, i.e., those having the longest line of well-trained 
ancestry, without mixture with effacing bloods, little or no training at all is required; the habit-structure is 
almost perfectly transmitted. Perhaps in this case transmitted habit never becomes perfect instinct; probably the 
best-blooded pups still require training. But this is because the process has not been continued long enough, the 
breeding has not been true enough, and the selection careful enough. (p. 662) 
 
This passage describes a mechanism that combines use-inheritance and selection in a very intimate 
way rather than viewing them as mutually supportive but essentially independent processes, as is 
typically seen in the work of most authors who accepted both Lamarckian inheritance and selection 
as mechanisms of evolutionary change. Natural instincts have been formed in the same way "except 
that in these cases natural training and natural selection have operated instead of human training and 
human selection" (p. 662). This process explains why instinct and intelligence vary inversely—the 
variable behavior produced by intelligence never has a chance to become habitual and so cannot be 
turned into instinct. 
 
LeConte continued to develop his views on the relation between the animal and the human 
mind in a series of papers that ranged over a variety of topics.
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 In the last of these he identified 
seven "essential differences between the spirit of man and the anima of animals" (p. 236): 
language, useful art (i.e., construction), fine art, thought, imagination, consciousness and self-
consciousness, and free will. He distinguished between the association of signs with external objects, 
characteristic of animal communication and the early use of language by infants, and fully 
developed language, which involves grammar; he claimed that animals could, in principle, master 
the use of words as signs but not the arrangement of words in their proper grammatical 
relationships (p. 240). Animal learning, he claimed, involves only a trial-and-error process, not 
rational thought, and he drew an explicit parallel between such learning and the evolutionary 
mechanism of natural selection, in terms that anticipate much later proposals by James M. 
Baldwin, B. F. Skinner, and Donald T. Campbell, among others:
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 "The successive improvement 
under such blind divergent trials and survivals seems to be wholly unconscious and unintentional, 
and therefore exactly like the improvement of the organism itself under divergent variation—
struggle for life and survival of the fittest" (p. 241). 
 
LeConte also drew a distinction that is very close to the contemporary distinction between 
explicit and implicit memory. Animals, he said, may appear to have memory, in that they profit 
from experience, but that experience does not seem to them to belong to the past (p. 252). In a later 
paper he repeated this point more explicitly, and he explained the lack of true memory in animals in 
terms of their inability to form a concept of self: "There is no consciousness of self as abstracted 
from conscious phenomena, and no conception of time as abstracted from events, and therefore no 
conception of events as occurring in the history of the ego."
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 The lack of a self-concept he saw 
as the fundamental difference between humans and animals, giving rise to all other psychological 
differences.
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LeConte thought that, despite this fundamental difference between human and animal 
psychology, there is a nonetheless an underlying continuity among all living things; he argued 
that all 
forces of nature are different forms of Divine energy immanent in nature in a generalized condition, and that 
throughout the whole geological history of the earth there has been a progressive individuation of spirit, first as 
the vital principle of plants, then as the anima of animals, until at last completed in man.
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Thus, in his view there is no contradiction between accepting the theory of evolution as an 
explanation of the origin and diversification of life on earth and believing that evolution itself, 
like all natural phenomena, is a manifestation of Divine will. 
 
Discussion 
Morgan, Bascom, and LeConte represent a range of positions on the relationships between human 
and animal psychological abilities, both in terms of their specific views and in terms of the 
theoretical frameworks within which those views were developed. Morgan, although classified as 
an "evolutionary anthropologist" in historical accounts of that discipline, was an evolutionary thinker 
only in a very narrow sense. He acknowledged that there have been changes in human societies since 
the earliest days of our existence, but he never accepted that species have evolved from one 
another, as proposed by Darwin. Indeed, he seems to have removed at least one reference to 
Darwin's work from an early draft of Ancient Societies at the suggestion of his friend the Rev. 
Joshua McIlvaine.106 In his writings on animal psychology he accepted the separate creation of 
different species and frequently referred to their being equipped by God with mental powers 
suitable to their needs. He was not even certain that evolutionary change occurred within animal 
species, although he was willing to entertain the possibility.107 His comparative psychology was 
undertaken at what might be called a purely descriptive level—he provided accounts of animal 
behavior intended to demonstrate the similarities between animal and human mental processes, but he 
offered no explanation for those similarities, beyond their creation by a beneficent deity. 
 
In some respects, Morgan's writing bears obvious similarities to that of much earlier writers who 
argued in favor of animal reason—classical authors such as Pliny, some of whose examples 
Morgan used himself, as well as those such as Charles Georges LeRoy (1723-1789), master of the 
royal hunt at Versailles, whose Lettres sur les animaux (1768) made the same sort of case as 
Morgan' s.
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 But if Morgan did not write evolutionary comparative psychology, he certainly 
wrote comparative psychology of a kind, and some of his ideas have an interestingly modern 
ring. He (largely) rejected the concept of instinct, in part because he thought he had the evidence 
to do so, but also in part because he thought it pre-empted the explanation of animal behavior by 
attributing their actions to an inherently mysterious force and so closing off scientific 
investigation—just as Kuo and other anti-instinct theorists would argue in the 1920s. He also 
rejected the concept because he thought that if one examines only the behavior of animals, 
without making prior judgments about their capabilities, it is unnecessary. Complex behavior 
has one incontrovertible explanation, namely, reason, and there is no need to invent another one 
unless the evidence requires us to. Today, one may question the evidence on which Morgan 
based his view, but the logic of his approach is quite sound. He was impatient with what he 
called "metaphysical" speculation on the question of animal mental abilities and both urged and 
practiced an observational approach to comparative psychological investigation. 
 
Bascom' s and LeConte's views differ from Morgan's in a number of significant ways. First, both 
are clearly evolutionary thinkers, albeit of a theistic rather than a naturalistic kind, reflecting the 
predominant approach to evolution in American science of the time. Both rejected the extremes 
of materialistic Darwinian evolution involving solely selection among fortuitous variations, on 
the one hand, and of special creation of species in their present form on the other. Their 
evolutionism was not the grudging acceptance of a distasteful if compelling theory but the 
wholehearted embrace of a view that both saw as a persuasive and ennobling framework for 
thinking about the relation of the human species to the rest of the natural world. Nonetheless, in 
their writings on comparative psychology, Bascom and LeConte both argued that there is a 
substantial gulf between the mental abilities of humans and other animals, preserving the special 
status of the human species in the face of the naturalistic arguments of Darwinian evolutionists. 
It is ironic that Morgan, with his acceptance of divinely created separate species, was more 
willing to accept the continuity of mental function between human and animals than either 
Bascom or LeConte, despite their evolutionary perspectives. LeConte' s writings also reflect a 
thoroughgoing comparative approach, grounded in evolutionary theory, to the study of complex 
organic and social systems. Indeed, in many ways LeConte's psychology is more worthy of being 
called comparative than is the later study of animal learning, with its reliance on a single species 
and its emphasis on general laws that would supposedly transcend species differences.
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Is it appropriate to consider these three writers comparative psychologists, and the works they 
produced contributions to the discipline of comparative psychology? The answer to the first part 
of this question must, I think, be "no." Labeling someone a comparative psychologist implies a 
professional identification that simply was not available prior to the 1890s and did not become 
widely accepted until the early years of the 20th century. Furthermore, all three of these authors 
wrote more extensively on other topics than on the psychology of animals, and Bascom's and 
LeConte' s autobiographies give no indication that their psychological work was central to their 
professional identities. The second part of the question, whether their work contributed to the 
discipline of comparative psychology, can be given a different answer. I contend that the 
publications discussed herein certainly are examples of comparative psychological writing, as 
that term should be understood in the context of the second half of the 19th century. Clearly, 
none of them represents experimental science, but comparative psychology has always 
incorporated observational study of the kind advocated and (to some extent) practiced by 
Morgan, and LeConte offered a principled argument why experimentation is in any case an 
inappropriate methodology for psychology. However, all of them looked to evidence from a 
variety of animal species to help them understand general psychological problems such as, for 
example, the relation of instinct to reason (Morgan), the role of simple learning in apparently 
complex behavior (Bascom), and the contributions of experience and inheritance to behavioral 
evolution (LeConte). All these are problems that were of great importance to comparative 
psychology when it began to develop as a scientific discipline later in the century. Bascom wrote 
a textbook with the title Comparative Psychology, and LeConte explicitly advocated a 
comparative approach to all psychological problems, so clearly they were working on problems 
that they themselves considered to be part of comparative psychology, even though their 
contributions failed to have any impact on the subsequent development of the discipline. 
 
What accounts for the fact that the writings of Morgan, Bascom, and LeConte were completely 
ignored by the next several generations of psychologists as they laid, and then built on, the 
foundations of the New Psychology between 1880 and 1910? Certainly William James and G. 
Stanley Hall had a strong interest in the topic of instinct and the relation of the human and animal 
minds, yet neither of them made any use of this literature. Even in his autobiography, Hall made 
no mention of his old teacher Bascom's writings on instinct, a concept that was central to his own 
and his students' thinking. References to earlier work on animal psychology in publications from 
the 1890s are mostly confined to the English evolutionary naturalists (Darwin, Romanes, 
Spalding, and Lloyd Morgan).
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There are, no doubt, several reasons for the lack of attention paid to the ideas of these early 
pioneers by the late 19th- and early 20th-century founders of experimental psychology. In the 
first place, Hall, James, and their contemporaries were engaged in the self-conscious 
establishment of a new science, and part of their agenda was to free themselves from the 
philosophical and theological concerns of the past. All of them were impatient with the 
speculative approach of their predecessors and eager to apply the experimental methodologies 
they had learned in German laboratories to psychological investigations in their home country. In 
doing so, they often found themselves opposed by the older generation of mental philosophers, 
many of whom still held influential academic posts and resisted the incursion of these new ideas 
into the curricula of their departments. James had to struggle against the influence of Francis 
Bowen, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Harvard, to be allowed to teach his course on "The 
Relations Between Physiology and Psychology" in 1875, and succeeded in part by emphasizing 
the difference between his subject and Bowen's.'11 Energized by the new ideas and 
methodologies that they brought with them from their training in German psychological 
laboratories, and eager to clear out what they saw as the intellectual cobwebs of mental 
philosophy, it is perhaps not surprising that the New Psychologists ignored the contributions of 
their indigenous predecessors. 
 
The situation might have been different if the writings I have described in this article had 
coalesced into a coherent program of research and investigation, rather than remaining a scattered and 
disconnected collection of publications. One of the great contributions of the New Psychologists was 
to institutionalize the discipline by creating academic positions and departments, founding journals 
and professional societies, and beginning the establishment of an identifiable research tradition 
that would recruit the next generation of scientific psychologists. Morgan, Bascom, and LeConte 
worked in isolation from each other, and there is no sign that any of them was aware of the others' 
work, apart from one reference to Morgan in Bascom's 1871 paper on instinct.
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 Morgan was not an 
academic; Bascom and LeConte were, but they worked primarily in very different disciplines, their 
universities were half a continent apart, and they would have had little opportunity to come into contact. 
Each of the three was deeply and successfully involved in his own professional sphere: Morgan 
founded a discipline, wrote several influential books, and was elected President of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science; Bascom published extensively and presided over the 
growth of a major research university; LeConte was an enormously successful teacher and a first-rate 
geologist and served as president of two major scientific organizations (AAAS and the Geological 
Society of America). However, their work on animal psychology was incidental to their primary 
professional activities. Morgan wrote almost nothing on animal behavior after the publication of his 
monograph on beavers in 1868, Bascom's Comparative Psychology attracted little attention, and 
LeConte never integrated his psychological ideas into a coherent theoretical statement or even a 
single major publication. Furthermore, all three wrote at a time when there were no established 
publications
113
 or professional societies through which they might have communicated about animal 
psychology. Hall' s American Journal of Psychology did not start publication until 1887 and was 
in any case very much a house organ for the Clark University Psychology Department, at least in its 
early years. The American Psychological Association was founded in 1892 and the Psychological 
Review in 1894.
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 In the third quarter of the 19th century there were no recognized outlets for articles 
on psychological topics, and articles that appeared in The Knickerbocker in 1843, or in Popular 
Science Monthly and Bibliotheca Sacra in the 1870s and 1880s, were unlikely to have been read 
by the experimental comparative psychologists who began their careers in the late 1890s. Taking their 
cue from Hall, James, and Cattell, these scientists looked to the British naturalists for problems to 
address and to their German experimental training for methodological inspiration; they did not seek 
out the writings of their American intellectual forebears. Nonetheless, the work of Morgan, Bascom, and 
LeConte represents an interesting chapter in the history of comparative psychology in America, and their 
ideas merit greater recognition by historians of psychology than they have yet received. 
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